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*Rejected*

I M T F E

The United States of America, et al.

-- Against --

ARAKI, Sadac, et al.

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S O R N      D E P O S I T I O N  
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Deponent : TOKUTOMI, Ichiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached  
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed  
in my country I hereby depose as follows.

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JAPAN'S TREND IN MORE RECENT TIMES

-- A Historical Observation --

by TOKUTOMI, Iichiro (seho)

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--- The End ---

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1. A Brief Sketch of My Life

Now I will narrate my life in brief sketch. Without exaggeration and without self-prociation I will tell what I myself believe is true.

My family lived for several hundred years at Minamata, which is bordered by mountains and facing on the sea. It is located close to Satsuma Province at the southern tip of Higo Province in Kyushu. In the national history written one thousand years ago, Minamata appears as one of the postal service stations established by the central Government.

My family was neither wealthy nor poor. In its native place it was of a prominent stock. From generation to generation its members were appointed local officials, and engaged themselves in river improvement, reforestation, reclamation and other work. They also established schools to promote local education.

My Father was a disciple of YOKOI, Shonan, and in the renovation of the Meiji Restoration contributed not a little to the administrative reformation of the Kumamoto Clan.

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Not only was YOKOI, Shonan, my Father's teacher, but also we were YOKOI's relatives by marriage, for his wife was my Mother's sister. I myself have been one of his disciples, the

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throughout their lives followed Shonan's academic views.

Shonan was one of the principal characters who effected the reformation of the Meiji Restoration. It is true that he was not the author of the "five-articled Imperial Covenant," which constituted the cardinal principle of the basic national policy in the Restoration. However, KURI, Kimimasa, one of his disciples, drafted the Covenant's first manuscript.

It was completed through joint efforts by many other collaborators and revisors. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that its guiding spirit is based upon Shonan's inspiration upon this point I have made detailed comments in my "National History".

Born in 1863( The third year of Bunkyo), around 1873 (the sixth year of Meiji) I entered the Kumamoto Yagakko, where I studied English under Captain Zens, an American. In 1876 (the ninth year of Meiji), I went to Tokyo, thence proceeded to Kyoto, where I entered the Doshisha College and became a disciple of NIIMI, Jo. I was at the University till 1890(the thirteenth year of Meiji); just before graduation, however I had a conflict of views with the University authorities, and without graduating left Doshisha for Tokyo.

While at the University I studied elements of history, politics, economics, and other sciences under Dr. Larned, an American. My academic career ended here.

From the age of eighteen, when I left the Doshisha University, till I was eighty-three on the 15 August, 1945(the twentieth year of Showa), I was almost constantly in newspaper work. Particularly, from 1890(the twenty-third year of Meiji) till



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1929 (the fourth year of Showa) as the president and concurrently the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Kokumin, and thence till the termination of hostilities as the guest of the newspaper Mainichi, I devoted most of my time to literary work.

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In addition to the publication of newspapers, I established the Minyusha Publishing Company, and engaged in the publication of books and magazines. My works published by the Minyusha and elsewhere total several hundred.

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Again, I rendered assistance to NIJIMA, Jo in his efforts to found a university. After his death, in order to fulfill his wishes, I became the chairman of its founding committee, and contributed my small share to the work.

For nearly a decade I did my best in the capacity of supervisor of the newspaper Heijo Nippo in Korea.

By establishing the "Kokuminkyoiku Shorenkai" (the National Education Promotion Society), I rendered service to the national education, and by founding the Aoyama Kaikan (the Aoyama Assembly Hall), I strove for the promotion of adult and social education.

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Yet what I concentrated my best efforts on, other than the newspaper work, was the compilation of Japanese history. To this work I have devoted nearly thirty years of my time, publishing seventy-odd volumes and completing over ninety volumes of manuscripts.

For this accomplishment I was awarded an Imperial prize through the Imperial Academy, given the Prince Arisugawa's Scholarship, and was appointed a member of the Imperial Academy. Shortly after this I was appointed also a member of the Imperial Academy of Arts. In 1911 (the forty fourth year of Meiji) I was nominated by the Emperor a member of the House of Peers. I was also awarded in 1943 (the eighteenth year of Showa) the Cultural Medal. I gave up all these last year. I have confined myself now to my home and am now nursing my illness.

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As persons who have influenced me most through my life I would mention the names of YUKOI, Shonan, NIJIMA, Jo, KITSU, Kaishu, and my Father TORUTOMI, Kisui.

Because of the difference in ages, I did not have the opportunity to come into personal contact with YUKOI, Shonan. However, all of his academic views I heard through my Father.

NIJIMA, Jo was a typical Japanese. He taught me what a Japanese should be.

KITSU, Kaishu was a Japanese of rare personality such as

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is seldom found amongst any or all persons I have associated with

From him I have learnt something of human philosophy.

This is all I am going to say about them except a few words which I should like to add here about my Mother.

My Mother taught me a great many things. Above all, she taught me that whatever straits I might get into I should trust in Heaven and calmly accept my fate. She practiced this teaching herself. Today, I am specially appreciative of the precepts left by my Mother.

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## II. Key to Japanese History (1)

Today the Japanese people are regarded as a war-like nation; and the Imperial policy of the Meiji Restoration is misunderstood as having aimed at Japan's armed invasion of the world. This is not confined to foreigners, but at present even certain Japanese have come to hold such a view.

If this is not a biased interpretation, it is a misunderstanding. As a student of Japanese History I feel keenly my own responsibility to elucidate the truth of the matter.

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If I am to give first my own conclusion of my study in Japanese history, I say the Japanese are second to no people or nation in the world in their love of peace. The Imperial policy in the Meiji Restoration aimed at having Japan, theretofore isolated from international society, join this society so that she might finally be in a position to do creditable service as member of it.

In a word, the Imperial policy was so formed as to have Japan progress of its own accord to other Powers' level, stand on an equal footing with them, and attain a status for maintaining harmony with them. In this sense one can never attach to Japan any intention of world invasion according to the Imperial policy. Throughout her career Japan has had no intention of invading the world, but has rather been in the fear of being invaded by the Powers. That she has been concentrating her energies on self-defence alone is the fact shown all through Japanese history.

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I should like to cite instances here to prove my point; only that would amount to my giving a lecture upon Japanese history.

I regret I am obliged to give here only conclusion induced from facts. Self-defence has been the most important matter for Japan. For this purpose her ancient Government erected barricades in the north-eastern province, dug moats in the south-western region, stationed a commander of local government in the north-eastern province, and guarded the south-western region with a conscripted garrison with permanently established headquarters.

It was not for the reason of its security alone that the Tokugawa Shogunate adopted the policy of national seclusion.

The Shogun closed the country to foreign intercourse lest Japan should be invaded by foreign Powers. In a certain respect this policy had something in common with the American Monroe Doctrine.

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To say nothing of historians of other countries, even Japanese historians do not understand what the Japanese national characteristics are like.

It is extremely difficult to state here in a nut shell the Japanese national characteristics, Japan's traditional national policy derived there from, and the history of how the traditional policy gave rise to the reformation through the Restoration. However, I should like to produce here a key for understanding all these.

What constitutes such a key? It is the fact that Japan had as her neighbour a big continental Power in China, which not only had far more extensive territory

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and far more numerous population, but also possessed a much higher culture than Japan.

In a certain sense it might be said that, mostly the Japanese national characteristics have been contributed to by, or been created under the influence of, China, if now moulded by China.

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Temporarily disregarding Japan's ancient history, when the Japanese about gained their self-consciousness, as broughtout above, they either became conscious of or felt unconsciously, the existence in their vicinity of a country whose land and population both were more than ten times or scores of times larger, and whose culture was far higher than Japan's.

Thus the Japanese felt culturally toward China deep emotion, great admiration strong envy, and deep longing.

Forgetting every thing else, they strove to imitate China. At the same time Japan wondered how she could preserve her own independent self besides such a great country. First came the competitive spirit for elevating Japan to an equal footing with China, culturally and in other respects. Yet however bitterly Japan strove, she was an island country with small population. However closely one tries to imitate a branch or a retail store is no match against its principal or wholesale store.

Thus, on the one hand, Japan did her best to imitate or to learn from China in every possible field; on the other, she strove to possess something which China lacked, whereby to keep up rivalry with her.

This made Japan acquire a strong imitative ability and adoptability. At the

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same time it helped her to cultivate a national characteristic of trying to find something which was peculiar to her alone. Traces of all these are clearly found in the Japanese today.

It is a serious mistake to make the charge that Japanese they are self-conceited enough to regard themselves as superior people, and to look down upon other nations. All that the Japanese hoped for at first was, that, though the Japanese were no equal to the Chinese, Japan might at least maintain her national prestige by imitating China's culture. In the next stage the Japanese aims were if China was superior in quantity, Japan should improve in quality; if China excelled in number, Japan should show higher grade; and if China boasted of her nationals, Japan should improve her spirit. The Japanese eventually managed to acquire consciousness that Japan at last had attained an equal footing with China on the score that, though China was a continental Power, at every revolution its dynasty changed;; and that though an island country, Japan was ruled by an over-unbroken line of Emperors.



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## III. Key to Japanese History (2)

In order to learn Japanese history it is best to make Japan's principal figures its index. One of the most suitable of such characters is Prince Shotoku.

He was the embodiment of the Japanese people's admiration for China; and yet at the same time their rivalry against China was crystallized in him. On the one hand, the Prince adopted Chinese culture and, institutions and, on the other, he despatched official documents, the salutations of which were, "The Eastern 'Tennu' informs the Western Emperor," I, or "The 'Tenno' of the Country of the Rising sun informs the Emperor of the State of the Setting Sun," II.

Generally speaking, whatever objects existed heretofore in Japan have been created to match similar objects in China.

The Mausoleum of the Emperor NINTOKU, for instance, which ranks among the grandest mausolea in the world, was erected probably in order to emulate such as the Li-Shan Mausoleum of the Founder of the Chin Dynasty, the Quinary Mausolea of Han, the Chao Mausolea of Tang, and so on. The same could be said of the great image of Buddha at NARA. Again, it was the same motive that led to the compilation of the "NIPPONSHOKI," deservedly called the fountain-head of the Japanese history.

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The Japanese at times felt respect for and at other times stood in fear of China; but despite respect and fear, their greatest efforts were directed to the maintenance of an independent status towards China



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and also to the demonstration of such.

Among the leading thinkers in Japan, there were seemingly two currents, one pro-Chinese and the other anti-Chinese. As a matter of fact, however, these two currents were traceable to one and the same source. The basic conception that Japan could not possibly cope with China developed, in passive minds, into zealous adoration towards China, and in defiant minds, into rivalry, if not antagonism. It was for this reason that the vast majority of the most prominent nationalists in Japan ranked at the same time among the greatest sinologues.

SUGAWARA, Michizane, famed as the Pai Lo-Tien of Japan, upheld the theory of being "spiritually Japanese even if culturally Chinese," admonishing that the Japanese, while copying Chinese arts, should take care not to lose the spiritual characteristics as Japanese. We have another example in KITABATAKE, Chikafusa, author of the "JINNO-SHOTOKI," which is the most excellent Japanese history of individual authorship. He was conversant not only in Chinese classics but also with teachings of such scholars as Cheng Chu, closer to him in the point of time; he was also well read in Chu Tzu's "TSUGAN-KOMON". Yet, he opened his "JINNO-SHOTOKI" with the specially emphatic statement "Japan is the country of gods," thereby giving Japan a position more than equal, and even superior, to that of China.

He had two major objectives for writing this book. The first objective was, as anyone would notice, to establish that the Southern Dynasty was the legitimate line of the Imperial Family of Japan. Secondly, he declared, with firm confidence, that not only was Japan superior, in the point of national policy, to such powers as China and India, but also she was more advanced, though few people seem to pay any attention

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to this second point. In short, the two major protests, that is, the protest of the Southern Dynasty against the Northern Dynasty, and the protest of Japan against China and India, constitute the very essence of this work.

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However, dissenting ideas, too, had attained considerable popularity in Japan. A Zen priest named ENCETSU, a near contemporary of KITABATAKE, Chikafusa, wrote a book entitled "CHUSEISHI," declaring that the ancestors of the Japanese Imperial Family had been the descendants of Tai-Po of the Wu Dynasty. Because of this he incurred adverse criticism of the Imperial Court and the book was subsequently ordered to be destroyed by fire.

On the other hand, the views of another Zen priest KOKAN who wrote the "GENKYO-SHUKUSHO," a kind of Buddhist history of Japan, belonged to a trend of thought similar to, if not the same as, that of CHIKAFUSA's.

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At the beginning of the Edo Era, YAMAGA, Soko wrote the "Facts About CHUCHO," setting forth his own opinions concerning a chapter, entitled "Age of Gods," of the "NIPPON-SHOKI." In reality, however, he merely added but little to what had already been set forth by KITABATAKE, Chikafusa. By CHUCHO he meant Japan, not China, and from the very title of the book, the contents would be self-evident. YAMAGA, Soko, too, was one of the most celebrated sinologues in those days.

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About this time the EDO Shogunate ordered the compilation of a Japanese history to the HAYASHI Family --- that is, HAYASHI, Yoshitomo, his son Shunsai, and so on ----- who were responsible for the educational affairs of the Shogunate. This book was known as the "HONCHO-TSUGAN." When the work was completed, it so happened that MITO, Mitsukuni, a relative of the TOKUGAWA Shogun and popularly called the Vice-Shogun, happened to censor it, before it was presented to the Shogun for inspection. At the wholly unexpected passages asserting that the Imperial Family of Japan had been descended from Tai-Po of the Wu Dynasty, MITSUKUNI became infuriated and it is generally held that the indignation actuated him to compile the "DAINIPPONSHI," a golden rule, so to speak, of the Japanese history.

Although personally speaking, I do not suppose such was necessarily the only motive for the compilation, yet at the same time, I do not think this the kind of idea to be dismissed with a smile.

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Up to the time of the ASHIKAGA Era, the Japanese used to be sheer idolators of China. ASHIKAGA, Yoshimitsu, for instance, used to take pride in his crown and clothes sent from China. At his death, he was given by a Chinese friend of his the posthumous name of "KYOKENO." After the TOKUGAWA Era, however, rivals other than China appeared, namely, western countries. Thus far China had been Japan's only neighbour; but since ocean navigation came into vogue, the number of Japan's big

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neighbours increased, that is, Western powers appeared. When the single neighbour China had been troublesome enough, the sudden appearance of so many new neighbours was unbearable. So, the Shogunate, deciding upon the policy of keeping them off as much as possible, issued a decree of national isolation. In spite of this, they came. The greatest of these neighbours was Russia. Japan had from the beginning respected China as a civilised nation; but the Russians she had feared as "red barbarians" rather than regarding them as a civilised people.

In the "Modern History of the Japanese People," I have stated at length how great was Japan's fear towards Russia and how deep was her worry over what should be done to meet Russia's southward advance. Side by side with the fear towards foreign countries, there grew also aspiration after foreign culture, as was evidenced by the enthusiastic study of the Dutch language. This, too, I have already related in detail. What the Japanese feared most was at first Russia; but by and by Britain became another object of fear. While Russia disturbed Japan's northern frontier, Britain, in violation of the Shogunate's national isolation decree, impudently forced her way into the NAGASAKI Harbour. The Magistrate of NAGASAKI, taking the responsibility upon himself, committed "harakiri."

Furthermore, the news of Britain's activities extending from the Indian Ocean to the China Sea constantly reached Japan. In point of national defence, the Japanese became greatly concerned as to whether or not Japan, now hemmed in on both sides by Russia and England, could possibly maintain her independence. Confronted with such a situation, Dutch scholar SUGITA, Gempaku, for instance, maintained that since

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it was by no means possible for Japan to meet Russia's southward advance the best way for Japan was to conform to the law "Might is right" and to make friend with Russia.

after on, about the time Commodore Perry came to Japan, HASHIMOTO, Sanse, man of long sight, argued that it was necessary for Japan now to become allied either with Russia or with Britain, and that, however, since Britain was cunning and hard to deal with, it was better to league rather with Russia. In short, the Japanese had substantially the same mental state, only more magnified and exaggerated, towards the Western powers as she used to have towards China. Far from contemplating aggressions, Japan was simply in awe and trepidation lest she herself should be invaded by foreign powers.

Besides, at the bottom of their heart all the Japanese, wise or otherwise, believed from their respective standpoints, that Japan could not possibly cope with, far less excell, other countries, although nobody dared to speak out. About the time of the MEIJI Restoration, there was not a single soul in Japan who believed Japan to be the greatest country in the world, who considered the Japanese as the greatest people, who thought of invading other countries, or who had a sense of superiority towards other nations.

Very rarely, however, some people did publish preposterous opinions. These, however, were mere boasts unfounded on any conviction. At bottom, they are traceable to the same motive as gave rise to the idea, prevalent in the last war, that if the foreign troops landed on the homeland of Japan, the Japanese should annihilate them with bamboo spears.

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#### IV. MOTIVES OF THE MEIJI RESTORATION AND BASIC POLICIES

I could not possibly enumerate here all the factors leading to the restoration. The most decisive motive or the root cause was that the Shogunate could not possibly maintain the independence of Japan; that, if left solely to the administration of the Shogunate, Japan might be invaded by various foreign countries and there was no telling what a miserable plight Japan would find herself in, what dishonour she would incur, and what total collapse Japan herself might meet with; that, therefore, the unification of Japan, with the Imperial Family at the very center, should be effected; and that the entire Japanese nation should do their best to defend Japan, so as to enable her to maintain her status as a fully independent state. Under such circumstances, the reform was effected in a short time and almost without any great difficulties.

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Consequently, the basic policy after the Restoration was nothing but to effect these aims, that is, firstly, to put Japan in a position free from foreign invasion; secondly, to let her attain perfect independence; and thirdly to enable her to join the international society and, as a member or an important member of the society, to act like a power in her dealings with various other powers. As a basic policy for the realization of these objectives was promulgated on 15 March in the year 1868 or the first year of MEIJI "The Imperial Covenant consisting of Five Articles." This Covenant

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determined the basis of Japan's national policy and served as the criterion for all matters. For about 80 years since its promulgation, up to the present day, almost everything has conformed, although with occasional digressions, to this covenant.

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The political leaders of the MEIJI Restoration were SAITO, IWANAGA, SAIGO, OKUBO, and KIDO. Apart from them, YOKOI, Shonan, was one of those, though not necessarily the only one, who drew up the general outline of the Restoration, or in other words, who set forth the fundamental principles. The "inspiration" of the Covenant was given by YOKOI, Shonan, to YURI, Kimimasa, the drafter or one of the drafters of the Covenant. This YURI, Kimimasa, himself knows better than anybody else.

YOKOI, Shonan, was not one of the so-called doctrinaires carried away by empty ideas and ideals. As even his opponents called his group "Practical Theorists," he kept his feet firmly on the ground while his face was turned heavenward. He was always trying to realise ideals and to idealise realities. Immediately after the Restoration, he was summoned by the Emperor, and he started from his home in the HIGO Province for KYOTO. On this occasion, YURI, Kosei, ---- then known as MITSUKI, Hachiro ---- belonging to the HIZEN Province, who had been appointed some time earlier to be a councillor of the Imperial Court, came to OSAKA to meet YURI. According to what YURI says (cf. "The Manuscripts Left by the Late Shonan") YOKOI then told YURI that Japan was truly a blessed country firstly because she had the Imperial Family of an unbroken lineage, and secondly, she was opened later than the various

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powers of the world.

Setting aside for the present the question of the unbroken lineage, what YOKOI meant was that not only were the Japanese able to make one grip of all sorts of knowledge that the Westerners had spend long years of hard application to acquire, but also the Japanese were able to choose between the merits and demerits of the Western culture, and that, therefore, they could learn much more in a much short period of time. YOKOI, according to him own words and writings, had great expectations for the Emperor MEIJI, who then was still in his boyhood. YOKOI firmly believed that this Emperor alone would be able to add glory to the restored administration. Although he himself was assassinated shortly afterwards by members of the "Extreme Conservatives," his aims were brought to fruition by his disciple and friend MOTODA, Gifu.

YOKOI wished, if possible, to go over to the United States himself, and convene, with the approval of the President, an international peace conference, for YOKOI believed that the greatest contribution Japan could make to the world was for her to take an initiative in the realisation of the international peace. His death, however, prevented him from carrying out his ideal. As is evident from what MOTODA said about YOKOI (cf. "The Manuscripts Left by the Late Shonan") YOKOI worshipped Washington, next to Yao Shun, ideal monarch of China, and used to maintain that the sovereign of a country should follow the example of Washington. It was his conviction as a Confucianist that the idea "Benevolence disarms enemies" could be put into actual practice. He aimed at a new code of political ethics and believed that the work of ethicisation should start with the home and gradually proceed to the town and village, the entire country, and finally to the whole world. It is needless to say that the post-Restoration government was formed indeed out of civil wars but

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by no means for the purpose of waging further wars, and its chief object was not only to maintain the sway of peace within the country but also to realise international peace throughout the world.

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These observations of mine are by no means desk theories. As a close examination of every one of the leading figures among the organisers of the post-Restoration government would disclose, there are no traces in the fact of any imperialists ever manipulating or directing the fundamental policies of the post-Restoration period.

In particular, the leading politicians of the post-Restoration government of Japan, such as Iwakura, Kido, Okubo, and so on made between the end of 1873 (the 6th year of MEIJI) a tour of inspection through America and Europe and seeing with their own eyes the actual conditions of various Anglo-American countries, came to the conclusion that Japan, as she was then, was no match for these countries, that the most important duty for Japan is to elevate her international status, and that, in order to do so, it was most urgent for her to copy after the good points of foreign countries. From their tour they came back with a firm determination to effect these objects. Under these circumstances there is not a scintilla of truth in the allegation that the post-Restoration government was a militaristic regime or that it was the forerunner of Japan's militarism. In the early stage of the Restoration, the Emperor MEIJI was still young and he had not yet acquired the ability to take administration into his own responsibility. From 1877 (the 10th year of MEIJI) onward, the Direct Imperial Rule, thus far only nominal, took form.

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to be realised. Among the political advisors, the two in whom the Emperor used to place greatest confidence were IWAKURA of earlier days and ITO of later years. Both of them were peace-loving politicians and no one would think of them, even for a moment, as militarists. And a Japanese who exerted a most profound influence on the Emperor Meiji was Eifu, MOTODA. "The lectures given by Professor MOTODA in the Imperial presence," published by me, shows what he told the sovereign. He was a small-scale Shonan YOKOI but he was devoid of his flaw of roughness and endowed with the sheen of a burnt gold and a pure gem. And so was his view. A foreigner who exercised a greatest influence on the Emperor was General Grant, sometime President of the U.S.... When he came to Japan in the autumn of the 12th year of Meiji (1879), the Emperor Meiji talked with him with unusual ardour. A youth of 28, as he was then, listened to the advice of General Grant which impressed him deeply. The General discouraged rather than encouraged over-zealous Europeanization of Japan. He expressed to the sovereign his fervent wishes that Japan would become a completely independent State and free herself from undue influences of the foreigners. The collected poems of the Emperor Meiji are eloquent how he was a model monarch of peaceful international conciliation. Thus, the Emperor, who was the pivot of the Meiji Government, and all the influential statesmen who assisted him were no militarists. Nor even a slightest trace of militarism was found in them. It does not require any special explanation on my part that such Emperor, such Government had no occasion for a conspiracy of world domination.

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In short, until the middle of the Meiji Era, both the government and the people were occupied sedulously on the achievement of complete independence. What harassed them most were extraterritoriality and absence of tariff autonomy. They were determined to recover their tariff and judicial rights at any cost. But the nation was divided into two factions over the question. The one faction proposed to raise the cultural standard of Japan speedily, and to plan and effect Europeanization of Japan to ease and satisfy the foreigners. The other faction rejected Europeanization of Japan and considered it a shortcut to make the Europeans give in and propose voluntarily the revision of treaties through numerous inconveniences and difficulties they were sure to feel if they should keep the Japanese in the lurch. In another word, the latter advocated strict observance of the treaty terms in opposition to the Europeanization policy of the former. For, should these terms be observed to the letter, the foreigners would not be allowed to trespass, for example, an inch further the ten ri limit of free passage which was stipulated by treaties. They would be then nonplused by such constraint and obliged to propose a treaty on equal terms. Public opinion was agitated but excitement subsided after the 27th and 28th years of Meiji (1894-5) when the question was settled of itself. The western powers recognized the continuous efforts of the government and the people since the Meiji Restoration and admitted the growth and development of Japan which the years had brought on her, if not as their equal. Thus Japan achieved her complete independence, as described by General Grant, thirty years after the foundation of the Meiji Government.

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V. Internal and external stimuli to  
modern Japan.

It was the western powers that taught Japan that she did not need to fear China. Japan not only followed their precept faithfully but became fully awake to the weakness of China. Respect and fear Japan had had towards China were now turned with doubled intensity to the western powers. However, there were such persons in Japan who did not concur with the current of the age. In the early years of Meiji, Koiku NAKAMURA published his view that China should not be held in contempt, warning the Japanese to modify their attitude towards China. In the years prior and after the Sino-Japanese War in the 27th and 28th years of Meiji (1894-5) when the Japanese people were elated with realization of vincibility of China, Kaishu KATSU cautioned them against their flippancy, drawing their attention to the superior intelligence and discretion of the Chinese people.

Now at this juncture I should like to say a few words on the Sino-Japanese War. The Sino-Japanese War can be considered as a continuation or repetition of the war which was fought in Korea against China in the reign of the Emperor Tenchi about 1,200 years ago, i.e. in the 7th century A.D., the only difference being that the Japanese influence in Korea was completely driven out by China by the war of ancient days

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and the Chinese influence in Korea was almost entirely driven out by Japan by the war in the 27th and 28th of Meiji, Korea had been the front line of Japan's defence since the ancient days in Japanese history. After complete evacuation of Japan from Korea, Japan redoubled the defence of Kyushu. But it did not prevent the attack of the Mongolians who used Korea as the basis of operation. Fortunately the "divine wind" drove away the Mongolian troops. But it did not mitigate her fear. Japan had since attempted to despatch troops to wipe out these basis of operations though the plans did not materialize because of her internal situation. In the 6th year of Meiji (1873) Takamori SAIGO and others advanced the so-called "Advocacy of the Korean invasion" but their real intention was to confront Russia by concluding a defensive alliance between Japan and Korea. The opposing parties made objections in fear of possible friction. Opinions differed between these parties for and against the proposed campaign only as regard to the method and policy of defense against the foreign powers, but there was no such difference as to the fact that Korea was the front line of Japan's defense, which had been a common knowledge since the foundation of Japan.

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Now I resume the subject I left. China had made so little of Japan from the very beginning. But she became offended by the Japanese encroachment on the Loochee Islands, Formosa,



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and Korea. Not only did she contempt and disdain but begin to hate; become indignant, and fear Japan. She adhered to her traditional policy of befriending distant States and antagonizing neighbours, and revenged herself on Japan by restraining Japan through the influence of the foreign powers. But this was not a wise policy for her, for the so-called breaking-up of China originated in it, to say the least of it. Even during the Sino-Japanese War, however, no small number of the Japanese hoped to shake hands with China. Pacifist statemen like ITO were these. General KAWAKAMI, a Japanese Moltke of the Sino-Japanese War, was also a very enthusiastic advocate of the cause. Neither did China lack those who considered Sino-Japanese co-operation advantageous to her in the long run. But the majority of the Japanese doctrinated with contempt for China. They made no particular study of her nor preparations, considering China as a stone lying in front of a gate which one can move at one's will. The Chinese, on the other hand, seethed with resentment and revenge, waiting for an opportunity for reprisal. But in view of the ferminability of Japan, they pretended innocence for the time being and patiently watched for such chance. Thus Japan and China had never reached mutual understanding and friendship in spite of their affinity geographical and linguistic since the Meiji Restoration. Of course, among the individuals of the two nations, considerable intimacy had



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developed, but as a nation their relationships had remained superficial throughout. They never had an occasion of whole hearted cooperation. It is not proper for me to discuss the right and wrong of the China Incident, so I will not dwell on this point any further. Japan paid dearly for her contempt of China, which has almost ruined her. Had the Japanese understood and studied China better, had they acted with more prudence, the present state of affairs would never have occurred. The present disaster may probably attributed to their lack of presence of mind. At any rate, the Japanese considered the Chinese as a race like sand. The Chinese on their part made the most of antagonism, hostility, and revenge against the Japanese --- or rather stimulated and enkindled antagonism against Japan, as we might say. Thus Japan played a part of cementing the sand of the Chinese, consolidating a heap of sand into a towering citadel of concrete. China had contributed to the development of national spirit in Japan. And now Japan in her turn paid back her obligation with interest, having contributed to the advent of the Kuomintang and the communist party in China. The United States deserted Japan in favour of China, but whether it is a change for the better, I am not in a position to say. History will show it in the nearest future.

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The so-called militarist clique never existed in Japan. I can firmly say so with my conscience. I am an old man, and as I have been connected with the Press since my mature days, I have met all kinds of the Japanese people. I was a war correspondent at the time of the Sino-Japanese War. I watched the development of the Russo-Japanese War as a closely interested party. I have never hesitated to express my views on the military and other questions.

Field Marshall YAMAGATA was the leading man and the helm of the Japanese Army. YAMAGATA, as Home Minister, twice Premier, and later Elder Statesman, exercised a most profound influence on politics in general, though he himself was a military. He reformed the military system of Japan and enforced the conscription law, thus abolishing the privileged class of samurai numbering 500,000 or 2,500,000 including their family, and making the entire nation share the duties of national defense. He personally attended the coronation of a Czar in Moscow as the delegate of Japan. He was a most enthusiastic advocate and supporter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. His illustrious deed was the establishment of self-government in Japan. He was probably one of the greatest statesmen of Japan in the last one hundred years, though I do not share his political views. He was not a militarist. He wished to complete armament, but it was for the sake of peace and national defense of Japan. He proved to be a sedative rather than a stimulant to the military in general. (See the "Life of Prince YAMAGATA," which is a true account of his life, written by Mr. Sano.) Same can be said

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about SAIGO, Jr., YAMAMOTO, TOGO, and others, who were the leaders of the Navy. Especially SAIGO and YAMAMOTO were advocates of international conciliation and stood firmly against starting troubles upon initiative of Japan. The influential persons in the Army and Navy, so far as I know, were no exceptions. For example, upon his departure from Japan as Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army, Field Marshall OHAYAMA was reported to have left a cordial message (T.N. to the Government) that he would take full charge of military operations but they (T.N. the Government) should not miss an opportunity to restore peace. Thus until the middle of the Taisho Era things moved on in perfect order in conformity with the wishes of the Emperor Meiji for peace. What was the <sup>cause</sup> cause, then, that brought irregularity to the political circles? The question must be studied from two aspects, internal and external.

I will start with the internal aspect. From the end of the reign of the Emperor Meiji, various cabinets were formed, party cabinets, bureaucratic cabinets, coalition cabinets of the political parties and bureaucrats, and others. The political parties, however, almost lost the confidence of the law-abiding citizens, if not the entire nation, through their high-handedness. The bureaucratic cabinets also could not maintain the confidence of the nation in a different sense. Political strife was a struggle for government positions and, again, for personal gains once that positions were obtained. Politicians of the day had no consistent objectives or principles. They

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led a "hand-to-mouth" political life, living in the present only, caring nothing for the consequences, coveting present ease, and being content when their desires were satisfied. The nation, who were thus disillusioned by the political parties and bureaucrats, thought that men of loyalty to the nation might only be found in the military or the fighting services. Some of the young members of the military, that is, officers fresh from the Military Academy or University, from first or second lieutenants to majors or <sup>lieutenants</sup>lieutenants-colonels, assumed upon themselves the duties of reforming Japan, and their activities culminated in the May 15 or the February 26 Incident. If a term "militaries clique" can be used at all, it may be applied to this faction, this gang, which was only a small portion of the military. But no such thing as militarist clique ever existed in the fighting services themselves. Unfortunately the military class, the last hope to the Japanese, which was considered free from all the corruptions and incompetences, proved no less scandalous upon its advent to power than the political parties and bureaucrats, bringing wars and miseries to Japan. I hope I have made it clear in what I said that the so-called militarist clique never existed in Japan.

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External stimuli became manifest after the World War I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had kept equilibrium in the East Asia. But it became only a nominal existence shortly after the

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World War I. Japan was given harsh treatment at the Versailles Conference by her former allies, Great Britain and her Dominions. Still harsher was the treatment the United States, Japan's semi-ally, accorded to her. At the Washington Conference, which followed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was dissolved. And Great Britain and the United States united themselves to put pressure on Japan who was then emerging into a full-fledged power. One is apt to mind other's business and forget his. The truth of this will become clear once the attitude of the Anglo-American countries to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War be recalled. Japan hoped at that time to step on the stage of the world hand in hand with the World Powers since she became a full-fledged power, but she found herself completely surrounded by thorns of hostility and antagonism. There is a Japanese saying "Envy will pursue merit as its shade." And that was the situation she found her in. The population of Japan, which was 30,000,000 at the time of the Meiji Restoration, reached 70,000,000 at the end of the Taisho Era. It was increasing steadily by over 1,000,000 a year. Shortage of food was a natural outcome. But a placard with "No Japanese Allowed" lettered on it had been raised everywhere in the world. Worse still, the Japanese nationals who had settled themselves abroad were driven out or threatened to be driven out. The United States, who had remained as a close friend to Japan since she opened her door to the world.

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now built a powerful armada with Japan as her potential enemy. Russia had remained a chronic menace to Japan. China, our neighbour, took full advantage of her policy of befriending distant states and antagonizing neighbours, obstructed the policies of Japan, and gave a rude check to her onset at every opportunity. But the Japanese cabinets remained unconcerned with such national emergency. Politicians who "have not" aspired to "have." Those who "have" tried to keep it. They were intent upon the struggle for political power and acquisition of concessions, and had no leisure to give thought to the national crisis or emergency. Under such circumstances, the younger set of the military was more or less justified in their indignation. Nor was it accidental that some of the nation expressed sympathy towards them. This was the actual situation that prevailed from the end of the Taisho Era to the middle of the Showa Era, judging from my long experience and observation.



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# VI. Self-existence, self-defense, and self-respect of Japan.

My observation from the viewpoint of a historian and a newspaperman (I am associated with the press over half a century) tells me positively that Japan is not an aggressive country nor the Japanese an aggressive nation but that she is on the contrary a peace-loving country and the Japanese a most peace-loving nation in the world. It is farthest from the Japanese to look upon the nations of the world with a sense of superiority, for they realize many disadvantages of theirs ---smallness of their country, scarcity of natural resources, lowness of their culture, though they do not show it outwardly. Such realization has led them to imitation, blind following, resistance, or creation of a special milieu, by which they have humoured their sense of inferiority.

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Generally speaking, there is no other nation than the Japanese who are so much attached to their own countries. They have a national trait to open their country to the world and absorb anything the world will offer, but it is not in their nature to push themselves on the world. "Norito" or prayers to the God, which is one of the oldest literature, declares that Japan will absorb everything and will not force others to adopt things Japanese. Japan has once said that she has many to receive from the world but few to offer it. I believe this is true to the national trait of the Japanese. It also

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proves that Japan is fully qualified to receive but not to give. In short, the Japanese has absorbtive faculty but little, if none, of expanding faculty. They are attached to their native places and never forget them for a moment when they are abroad. Even ABE-NO-NAKAMARO, a Japanese overseas student who went to China in the Tao Period and succeeded to obtain an important government position there, wrote in his verse, "Oh Moon that shines over the MIKASA hill!", longing to see the familiar landscape in Nara. Thus a nation who has much of centripetal force but little of centrifugal force never dreams of world domination or encroachment on its neighbours. Why did such a nation then find its way to various places in the world after the Meiji Restoration? It was because of difficulties of living. Shortage of food and clothing drove them abroad in spite of their national trait.

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All the moves of the Japanese Government, the people, or rather the entire nation since the Meiji Restoration were motivated primarily by self-existence. That is, the Japanese people began moving out of their country in search of livelihood --- food and clothing. The second motive was self-defense. These moves were aimed at achieving complete independence, maintaining her prestige as an independent country, and safeguarding such independence from the foreign influences. Wars Japan was forced to be engaged in from the Meiji Era to the present day were fought mostly for these

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purposes. They were wars for self-existence and self-defense.

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The third motive was self-respect. That is, a protest as a result of explosion of dissatisfaction and malcontentment with unfair treatment the World Powers accorded to Japan as an independent State. Japan, on the other hand, fell in the mood that "Alexander was a man, so am I," so to speak, when she saw what the World Powers had done. She thought it too undignified and pluckless to remain a mere looker on to what Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Germany and other World Powers were doing. Thus, the so-called national "aspiration" should be considered as a motive for her moves. In short, this is nothing but the manifestation of imitative nature with which the Japanese are richly endowed. For example, even a strict abstainer, whether a secretary of a Temperance League or a minister of the Church, will be excited and join in dancing, if wine flows in abundance, songs rise in glee, women whirl in dance. More so for an ordinary man. Suppose that the moves of Japan had been tainted with imperialism, who were they that taught the Japanese what Imperialism is? They were the World Powers, I do not hesitate to say so openly. History of Japan from the latter half of the Nineteenth Century to the early half of the Twentieth Century was not of her own but closely interwoven with that of the world. It shows that Japan was constantly imitating what the senior powers had

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done, though she might have been clumsy in playing her part compared with the other powers. There is a Japanese saying "People ruin themselves by trying to ape their betters." This saying may be applied to Japan, with this reservation that while the "ruined people" aped was not of their invention but of "their betters." The World Powers, if I may compare them to cormorant, dived into the water and caught fishes big and small. Japan took the suite but failed to catch any fish and drowned herself. The folly of the Japanese is indeed unsurpassed. The World Powers that set them such examples may laugh and jeer as much as they please at the clumsiness of the Japanese. But censure or condemnation of Japan for it on their part will never be considered as an act of fairness in the eyes of God.

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If the Japanese are to be blamed, they should be blamed for their misjudgement of China, the Anglo-American powers, the U.S.S.R., Germany, Italy, and most of all Japan herself. As Suntsu said, the Japanese knew neither others nor themselves. This is the cause of the present disaster. Thus the Japanese have nobody to blame but themselves. Some Japanese, however, shift the responsibility for the disaster to a limited number of persons, such as military clique or financial magnates and remain unconcerned. The responsibility for all the actions taken by the Japanese must rest with all the nation. Although there is difference of degree in the responsibility, those who pretend innocence and try to gain credit at others' expense should be guilty of

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forgetting what Japanese Spirit stands for.

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I do not hesitate to acknowledge even now that I, as a member of the Japanese nation, believed in every letter of the Imperial Rescript on the Declaration of War on December 8 in the 16th year of Showa (1941). I am not in a position to criticise it now in view of His Imperial Majesty's broadcast on August 15 in the 20th year of Showa (1945), but I am convinced that, as the Imperial Rescript said, this war was never welcome to the Japanese but it was a war forced on them --- a defensive war and that Japan had no other way but to find life in death and to start action without any thought for the result since the so called A B C D line closed on her so tightly that she could neither keep still nor find refuge. Even today I still believe in the implications of this Rescript. Although only too short a time has elapsed since then to discuss the matter without prejudice, and although I am conscious of my disadvantageous position as Japanese newspaperman which will probably make my views less accredited than I believe them to deserve, I am none the less convinced that they will no doubt be accepted by unbiased historians who may come a hundred years later.

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In conclusion, I should like to talk about myself as a newspaperman. From the beginning of the Taisho Era I was firmly convinced that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. were two

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great meances to Japan and warned our people against them. Since my childhood days I have owed much to the Anglo-Saxon civilization. At the beginning of my career as newspaperman, I was so much impressed by "The Nation," a magazine still being published in New York though under different management, that I named the newspaper I started "The Kokumin Shimbun," a Japanese equivalent to "The Nation." So I never hoped to fight against the U.S.A. But after the U.S.A. dealt series of blows to Japan concerning the immigration problem and Japanese school question in the Pacific coast or at the Washington Conference, I felt a great danger from the view-point of national defense and self-respect. Accordingly I gave a warning not only to the Japanese but to the Americans as well. Part of my warning was in fact translated into English and published in New York.\* ("Japanese-American Relations," by the Hon. Iichiro Tokutomi. Published by The Macmillan Co. N.Y. 1922.) I was quite candid and blunt in this article, but it was because I am a "candid friend" of the Americans and I hoped from the bottom of my heart that the Americans would change their attitude to Japan. Beside this book, I contributed many articles to magazines and newspapers for the purpose of improving America-Japanese relation-ship. Also the same principle pervades all the rest of my works. But as the situation developed, not only Japan's self-defense and self-respect were endangered by the U.S.A. but even the national life of Japan became exposed to danger by the abolition of Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, freezing of assets, and

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embargo of U.S. export to Japan. Now Japan's self-existence itself was involved. Thus the three great principles of Japan since the Meiji Restoration were violated by the United States and her allies and Japan was forced to give up hope. All my labours were lost, all my works were written in vain. My heart bleeds when I think of the present plight of Japan. Sorrow and shame for my incompetence heavy on my aged heart when I realize that I failed in realizing the teaching of my master Shonan YOKOI, and that all my life's labour as a newspaperman was brought to naught.

On this 20th day of Feb., 1947

At #119, Oshinode, Izuyama, Atami

DEPONENT TOKUTOMI, Ichiro (seal)

I, \_\_\_\_\_, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) HAYASHI, Itsuro (seal)

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OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell  
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding  
nothing.

TOKUTOMI, Ichiro (seal)

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TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Funiko Fukuoka of the defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Affidavit of Ichiro Tokutomi is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Funiko Fukuoka

Tokyo, Japan

Date February 26, 1947

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最近代に於ける日本の動向  
――史的觀察――

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歐米化主義對條約勸行論 (24) 日本の完全獨立生成 (25)

25

日本に對する歐米の教訓 (25) 對支態度への數字海舟の警告 (25)  
日清役の總源的觀察 (26) 蒙古來襲 (26) 征韓論の目的 (36) 國防の第一線たる朝鮮 (27) 支那の對日感情變化 (28) 意交近攻 (28) 支那分劃の端緒 (28) 日支握手提携の期待者 (29) 日本人の對支安易感 (29) 支那の隱忍 (29) 遂に親善の實なかりし (29) 曉夢支那を堅凝せしめたるは日本 (30) 日本には所謂軍閥無し (30) 平和主義者山縣元帥 (31) 西郷、山本、東郷、大山 (31) 大正中期以後日本政界の變調 (32) 其日臺しの政黨及官僚政治 (33) 青壯軍人の不滿爆發 (33) 不幸なる日本一軍人階級の魂膽 (33) 第一次世界戦後日本に對する外部の刺激 (34) 日本は荆棘の重圍 (35) 出る杭は叩かる (35) 日本人入る可らず (35) 國家の安危に無關心の政治 (35)

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## 一、予の略歴

森 徳 富 猪 一 郎

予は今こゝに予の略歴を語る。誇張もせず、説きもせず、予の自ら眞實と信ずる所を語る。

予の家は、九州肥後の開始、國摩に昇したる、山を帯び海に瀕したる水俣に、數百年居住してゐた。此地は千年以前の創史にも、中央政府で定めたる縣志の一であつた。予が家は、貧でもなく、富でもなく、其の土地に於ては屈指の家柄として、代々地方の公吏となり、治水、植林、開墾等の事に従ひ、又た學校を設けて、地方の教育をも扶けた。予が父は、森井小楠の門人にして、維新の改革には、熊本藩政の改革に、貢獻する所が少なくなかつた。

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森井小楠は、予が父の師であるばかりでなく、又た小楠の夫人と予が母とは、姉妹であつて、姻戚の關係があり、予自身も亦た一生を通じて、小楠の學說を受け継ぎたる一人であつた。小楠は明治維新の改革に際し

ては、其の重なる指導者の一人であつて、明治維新の根本國策の基調とも云ふべき五條の御誓文は、彼れ自ら執筆者でなかつたが、其の最初の原稿は、彼れの門人由利公正が、執筆したるものであつて、他にも幾多の参加者、修正者があつて完成したが、然かも其の根本精神は、小楠のインスピレーションに本づく事は、疑を容れない。此事に就ては、予の國民史で、詳しく敘述してゐる。

予は一八六三年（文久三年）に生れ、一八七三年（明治六年）頃熊本洋學校に入り、米人キャプテン・ゼンスに就て、英語を學んだ。一八七六年（明治九年）東京に赴き、更に京都に到り、同志社に入學し、新島襄の門下となつた。而して一八八〇年（明治十三年）まで滞在し、卒業の間際に至り、學校當局と意見を異にし、卒業證書を擲へずして、東京に去つた。同志社在學中は、米人ラーネット博士に就て、歴史、政治、經濟等の初步を學んだ。予の學歴は之に止どまる。

予は同志社を去つた年、即ち予の十八歳より、予の八十三歳、一九四五年（昭和二十年）八月十五日まで、殆ど間斷なく、新聞人として、新聞に従事した。中にも一八九〇年（明治二十三年）より一九二九年（昭和

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四年)までは、「國民新聞」の社長及び主筆として、又た其後終戦の日までは、「毎日新聞」社賓として、専ら筆を執つた。而して晩年推されて大日本新聞協會會長に任じた。

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新聞刊行以外に「民友社」なるものを起し、雜誌、新刊書籍の出版發行等を爲した。此の民友社にて、又た社外にて、予の出版したる著書は、數百部にも上つてゐる。

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予は又た新島襄氏を扶け、其の大學創立には、聊か盡す所あり。更に氏の死後、同氏の志を完成するために、大學委員長となつて、聊か力を效した。又た朝鮮に於ける「京城日報」の監督者として、十年未滿其の力を盡した。又た「國民教育獎勵會」を設けて、國民教育のために貢獻し「青山會館」を設けて、成人教育、社會教育等のために努力した。

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然かも新聞記者以外に、最も予の力を效したのは、日本歴史編纂の一事

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/bb5d6f/>

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であつた。之は今日に至るまで、殆ど三十年に幾かき歳月を費し、出版せられたるものが、既に七十餘冊。原稿の出来上がつたものも、既に九十餘冊に及んでゐる。之が爲に、予は帝國學士院にて、恩賜賞を與へられ、又た有田川宮賞學金を與へられ、而して學士院會員に推薦せられた。又た幾度も、帝國學術院會員にも、推薦せられた。更に一九一一年、明治四十四年、帝國學術院會員に勧選せられた。而して一九四三年、昭和十八年、文部省勲章を授けられた。それらの一切は去年悉く辭退して、今日では門を閉じて謹慎、病を養ふてゐる。

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最後に、予の一生に於て、最も予を感化したる者を選ぐれば、横井小楠、新島襄、勝海舟及び予が父徳富洪水である。横井の稿には、年譜の相違のために、詳しく説するの機會を得なかつたが、其のしるべき學説は、予の父を通して、之を悉く學が出來た。新島襄は、其のしるべき學説は、予は彼れに依て、日本人は斯く在るべきものと云ふ學を、教へられた。勝海舟は、予が接したる多くの人物中、稀に見る卓越の日本人であつて

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予は彼に就て、聊か人間學の一斑を、學び得たと思ふ。以上に止どめて  
尙ほ一言するは、予の母である。予の母は、予に多くの事を教へた  
其中にも、如何なる境地に陥つても、天を信じ、命に安んずる事を教へ  
た。彼女は自らそれを實行した。予は今日に於て、常に予の母の遺訓を  
有難く感じてゐる。

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## 二、日本歴史の鏡（一）

今日では、日本國民を好戰國民とし、維新の皇謀は、日本が武力を以て世界を侵略せんとするに在るかの如く誤解せられ、外人のみでなく、日本人の中にも、往々斯かる説を、現在に於ては、爲す者あるに至つた。之は全く、曲解に非ざれば、誤解であつて、予は今日本歴史の研究者たる一人として、其の真相を語る義務あるを痛感す。

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予の日本歴史検討の上から、先づ其の結論を掲ぐれば。日本國民は、平和を愛好するの點に於ては、世界の何れの民族又は國民に劣らない。而して維新の皇謀は、是迄國際社會の外に孤立したる日本を、國際社會の仲間に入れ、其の一員として、相當の働きを爲すべき位地に、到達せん事を目的としたものであつて、一口に言へば、日本が世界列強並に、自ら進歩し、列強並の立場を占め、列強と與に協調を保つて行くべき位地に、到達する事を、目的としたものである。其の意味から言へば、世界侵略などと云ふ事は、夢にも考へなき事である。從來日本の歴史は、

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世界を侵略するよりも世界より侵略せらるる事を、最も怖れ、常に其の防備のみを、目的としてゐた事は、日本歴史の初めより終りまで、一貫したる一の大なる事實である。予は此處に事實を擧げて語らんとするもそれでは日本歴史の略義となるから、遺憾ながら唯だ其の事實の上から簡納したる結論だけを、擧げて置く。即ち自衛と云ふ事は、日本に取ては、何よりも最も重大なる事であつて、東北に柵を設け、西南に水城を築き、東北には鎮守府將軍を置き、西南には防人を徵發して衛戍せしめ太宰府を設けて、之を管轄せしめたるが如き、皆然りで。徳川幕府が鎮國令を布きたるも、單に徳川幕府其物の安全を、主とするばかりでなく日本が外國から侵略せられざらん事を欲して、行はれたる政策であつて、或る意味に於ては、徳川幕府の鎮國政策は、アメリカのモンロー主義と似通つたものがある。

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世界の歴史家は素より、日本の歴史家さへも、日本の國民性が何物である事を諒解してゐない。今ま此處に、日本の國民性、従つて其の國民性

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より弱き出したる、日本の傳統的國策、其の傳統的國策を延長して、維新の改革に及びたる迄の由來を、一口に述べる事は、最も困難である。然し予は今ま此處に、其の遠<sup>キ</sup>だけを、示して置きたいと思ふ。鍵とは何である乎。日本の隣國に、支那なる大陸の大國が存し、單り土地が廣く人口が多きばかりでなく、文化の程度に於て、非常なる懸隔ある、其の一國の存在したる事である。或る意味から言へば、日本の國民性は、其の過半は支那に依て、若し製造されたと言ふ事が出來なければ、寄與せられ、若くは感化せられたと言ふ事が出來やう。

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日本の上古史は姑く措き、日本人が日本人として、自ら自認める頃に於て、日本人の眼には、前に申した通り、其の附近に、土地も人口も、日本よりも十数倍し、若くは幾十倍し、其の文化の程度に於ても、日本より最も高級の地位を占めた國を、或は意識し、或は無意識中に感得したであらう。茲に於て日本人は、文化的には支那に對して、大なる感<sup>ワス</sup>敬、大なる嘆美、而して大なる羨望、大なる憧憬を覺へ、何等も遺れて之に

模倣せん事を努めた。同時に又た日本自身は、此の大國の傍に在つて、如何にして日本なる國民一己を、保つべきかを考へた。即ち第一は、文化的に於ても、其他の點に於ても、日本を支那と同等の不平に待つて行くと云ふ、所謂の競争心である。然るに如何に競争しても、日本は島國である。日本の人口は少くある。如何に模倣しても、本家本元程に、其の出店（デパート）數は、及ぶものでない。それで一面支那に對して、凡有る模倣若くは學習を努めたが、他の方面に於ては、支那の持たざる何物かを持ち、それを以て支那と競争せん事を努めた。此の如くにして、日本人には、大なる模倣性、大なる道用性を發見したると同時に、又た日本獨目の或物を發見せんとする一種の性格を、發見した。それ等の總ての物が、今日の日本人には盛々として其の露跡が、見出されつゝある。日本人は已惚れて、自ら倣越精神を備へ、他國を羨望するなどと云ふ事は、飛んでもない間違ひであつて、日本人は、支那に對しては、到底及ばぬがせめて支那文化の模造でもして、日本の體面を保ちたいと云ふのが、精一杯であつて、それから更に一層して、支那何者ぞ、彼れが量で來れば、我れは質で當る。彼れが欲で來れば、我れは品で當る。彼れが物質で來れば、我れは精神で當る、

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と云ふやうになり。支那は大陸であるが、易姓革命の國である。我れは島國であるが、萬世一系の皇統を載いて居ると云ふ、此の一點で、漸く日本も支那と對立するだけの位地を、占むるに至つたと意識するやうな點まで、溜ぎ付けたのである。

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三、日本歴史の(二)

日本の歴史を知るには、日本の真なる人々を、其のインデキスとするに若くはなし。其の最も適當なる一は、聖德太子である。彼は日本國民の支那に對する崇拜心を、一人で背負つて立つと同時に、又た支那に對する自立心若くは競争心を、最も遺憾なく發揮してゐる。一方では、日本の創成の皇統に向つて、真天皇百皇帝に告ぐとか、日嗣の天皇日汝の皇統に告ぐとか云ふやうな文書を、交結してゐる。凡そ日本に於て、今日まで存在したるもので、支那を對象としたものは少ない。例へば仁徳天皇の御説の如きは、世界に對して、其の天を誇るに足るが、之も其の天皇の親山の晩や、清の延暦若くは唐の貞觀に比すべきものであらう。又た奈良の大嘗なども、主として、日本歴史の父とも云ふべき日本書紀も、其の意趣に於て、編纂されたものである。

日本人は、一方で支那に對して、時として尊敬、時としては恐怖を持つてゐるが、又た其の尊敬の半面、恐怖の半面には、支那に對しては自



一己を保持し、甲斐に又た之を發揮するに、最も苦心した。日本の思想界には、向支排斥支那の二潮流あるが如く見へるが、其實は其の淵源は一である。即ち、支那に何とでも教はぬと云ふ根本思想が一はそれを順に受けて、支那崇拜に没溺し、他はそれを逆を受けて、支那排斥と云はざる迄も、對抗の方面に發展した。それで、日本に於て最も偉大なる日本主義者は殆ど擧げて尽く大なる支那學者である。例へば日本の空樂天と呼ばれざる、菅原道真の如きは、「和漢朗詠」の説を述べて、學術に於ては支那に學ぶも、精神に於ては、日本固有の物を失ふ勿れと警してゐる。又た個人の著作したる日本歴史の中で、最も卓出したる「神武正統記」の著者北畠親房の如きは、それである。親房は、支那の古典に熟じたるばかりでなく、彼れと時代接近したる程朱の學やら、朱子の「綱目」なども讀んでゐる。然るに彼れの「神皇正統記」は、巻頭に「日本は神代なり」と断言して、自國を支那と對等の位地に置くばかりでなく、より以上の時まで、持ち上げである。彼の學は二つの大なる目的を以て發せらるゝ。第一は、日本の皇室は、南朝が正統であると云ふ事

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である。之は許れども氣付く所である。其二は、日本は支那印度の蠻大  
 鮮に比して、蠻野として劣らぬばかりでなく、立ち勝さつてゐると云ふ  
 言を、暗喩明目して語つてゐる。此の方面には、世間では餘り關心の人  
 が、少ないやうに思はれる。要するに、北朝に對する南朝の抗議、支那  
 印度に對する日本の抗議、此の二大抗議が此書の生命である。

然し又その反對の思想も、日本には相當流れてゐた。北畠親房と強ど  
 時代は紹興を以て開元なる開元は、「中正子」と稱する筆を著流して、日  
 本皇室の祖先は、吳の泰伯の子孫であると書き、其の爲めに朝廷の尊嚴  
 を受け、其の尊嚴は毀かれたと云ふ事がある。之に反して、同じ開元で、  
 日本書紀史とも云ふべき「元享御書」の著者鹿野和尙の意見は、皇統の  
 系統が朝鮮と同一と云はぬまでも、其の源らに在つた。

江戸幕府の初めに於て、山鹿素行は「中朝事實」を著した。「中朝事  
 實」は、日本書紀神代の條に就て、其の意見を述べたるものであるが、  
 之は北畠親房に之續を挙げたる想であつて、中朝と云ふ點は、支那の事

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ではなして、日本を中絶と稱してゐる。當時の耳目を見ても、其の内容を知る事が出来る。然るに此の山鹿素行も又た、當時に於ける、最も卓越したる文藝家であつた。之も前後して、江戸幕府は、其の暴政を露らしめたる林家——林家とは、道楽及世子素賢翁のこと——に命じて、日本歴史を撰纂せしめた。

それが即ち「本朝通記」である此の歴史が撰纂せられて、それが被纂せらるゝ際に、徳川幕府の親戚で、世襲で何代も世襲したる水戸光圀が、之を讀しやる所、意外にも、日本の皇統は、吳の泰伯の孫である云々の事が書いてあつたから、そこで光圀は、之は宜しくないと憤慨して、そこで日本歴史の金科玉律とも云ふべき「大日本史」の撰纂を、思ひ立つたと云ふ事が傳はつてゐる。予は必ずしも、之が唯一の動機とも思はぬが、此の傳説も亦た、一笑に付すべきものではないと思ふ。

足利氏時代は、日本は全く支那崇拜で、足利義満の如きは、支那から衣冠を貰ひ、それを着けて誇りがましくして居り。彼れの死するや、支那から恭愍王と謚名した。所が徳川幕府以後は、支那の代りに、異つた

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活動は、手に取るやうに日本に於て、日本に對するの望に於まつて、  
 して其の樹立を促す事が出来るや否やと、國防上に於ける一大關心が  
 であり。之を前にしては、有名なる露西學者杉田玄白の如きは、とても  
 幕府下の勢には、對峙する事が出来ぬから、馬をものには終かれよと  
 かく隠微と經手するに當らずと言ひ。又た其後ペルリ提督の日本に來る  
 時代は、幕本左内なる、當時の卓見者、今日の日本は、實に弱ぶか、  
 其に弱ぶか、何れ弱か弱ぶ必すがある。然し、其は老練にして胆し難い  
 から、寧ろ強に振ふに當らずと云ふ論を立ててゐる。「やゝるに、世に  
 の心で強弱は、計略を以て大し、強くは加害して、對西洋となつて弱た  
 のであつて、日本は強弱どころか、僅々乎として、外國から侮れらるる  
 る事を、終れ悔れてゐた。又た外國に超越どころか、とても外國に及  
 ばぬと云ふ事を口に出さず大に言ふ事はなかつたが、心中には堅不肯  
 れも言ふ、能々の立身々々で考へてゐた。日本が世界第一の強であり、  
 日本國民が世界第一の國民であり、他國を侮れたり、他國に對して愛  
 敬意を持つなどと云ふ事は、維新頃の日本人には、藥にしたくも、無

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事であつた。即ち即ち子外れた言辭を、それが全く心に  
もなき言辭がりを言ふたものであつて、恰かも今度の戦争で、外制軍が上  
陸したをら竹槍で突き刺すと云ふ點と、其の根本動機は、即ち一であつた。

四、明治維新の動機と根本政策

維新の政策は、其の動機は今此處に悉く擧ぐる譯にはゆかぬが、最も大  
なる動機、即ち根本原因とも言ふべきは、幕府では到底日本國の獨立が  
出來ない。幕府に任かせてあげれば、日本は諸外國の爲めに侵略せられて、  
如何なる憂目を見、如何なる恥辱を蒙り、總ては日本其物が亡滅するに  
至るも測られない。依て皇室を中心とし、日本を統一し、日本國民の全  
力を擧げて、日本國を防禦し、完全なる獨立國として、存在せねばなら  
ぬと云ふ事であつた。これが即ち、殆んど大なる國策なくして、改革が短時  
日の間に、成就せられたる所以である。

× × × × × × × ×

從て維新以來の根本政策は、其の趣旨を遂行するに外ならなかつた。即  
ち第一は、先づ日本國を、外力より安全なる地位に置く事である。第二



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は、日本國を完全なる獨立國とする事である。第三は、日本國を、  
社會の仲間入りをなし、其の一として、若くは實もなる一として、  
上に列強並の地位をなさしむる事である。而して如上の目的を達する  
ためには、其の根本政策として、定めたのが、即ち明治元年（一八六八）  
三月丁丑日陰布せられたる「五條の誓文」である。五條の誓文が、我が  
皇國の基調であつて、一切の事は、之より導き出して來たものであつて、  
清國と八十年の時としては横道に逸つた事もあるが、然して言へば、  
其の道に沿つて、今日に至つた。

X  
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X  
X  
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X  
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X

明治維新を政治的に指導したるは、三條、岩倉、西郷、大久保、木戸であつたが、其の大なる筋書を指導したる、即ち指導原則を與へたのは必ずしも彼一人と言ふ事は出来ぬが、其の代表的一人は、横井小楠である。前にも述べたる如く、五條誓文のインスピレーションは、横井小楠が、其の原案の起草者若くは其の一人、由利公正に與へたものであつて、それは誰れよりも先づ由利公正が、明かに之を認識してゐる。横井小楠は、世の所謂空想理想に趨る、所謂ドクトリナリではなかつた。彼の反對者へも、彼れの一派を、「實學黨」と稱した程であつて、彼は眼は天を眺めたるも、足は地を踏んでゐた。彼は空に理想を實際化する事を夢みてゐた。彼が維新の初め、其の故郷肥後より、朝廷の召命を承けて、京に喚び出されたる際に、彼より先に朝廷の參與に任じてゐた越前守由利公正（當時は三間八郎）は、彼を大阪に迎へたが、横井は由利に同つて、日本は海に幸運である。第一は、日本が萬世一系の皇室を戴いてゐる事である。第二は、日本が世界列國に倣れて、開かれたる事であると云ふたと、由利は語つてゐる。（「小楠遺稿」参照）萬

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世一系の事は、今此處に語らず。横井が斯く言うた事は、西洋人が千辛  
 萬苦して得たる一切の智識は、日本人が其儘之を學修する事が出来るの  
 みならず、西洋の短を捨てて、其の長を取る事が出来る。それで勞は少  
 なくして、功は之に倍すると云ふ事を、意味したものであらう。而して  
 横井は、其の書きたる物に依て、且つ其の語りたる物に依て見れば、少  
 年であつた明治天皇に、大なる望みを屬し、天皇に依て維新の大賊が光  
 を放つ事が出来ると、斯く信じてゐた。而して彼は、遂て頑冥無の爲に  
 に、暗殺せられたが、彼れの志は、彼れの門人でもあり、且つ友人でも  
 ある。元田永孚に依て、完成せられた。横井は、出来得べくんば、自ら  
 日本の使節となつて、米國に押渡り、米國大統領の同意を得て、世界平  
 和の會盟を倡し、世界平和の端緒を、日本に依て替く事が世界に對する  
 第一の貢獻であると、信じてゐた。但だ之は、其人亡んで、其の理想は、  
 實行出来ずして已んだ。横井は、支那に於ける理想的君主たる堯舜の次  
 には、ワシントンを崇拜し、一國の元首たる者は、ワシントンを以て、  
 模範とせねばならぬと唱へてゐた事は、元田の横井に就て、語つたる所

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に依ても、明白である。「小楠遺稿」参照。彼は儒教の信者であつて「仁者敵無し」と云ふ言葉を、事實行出來るものと、考へてゐた。彼の目的は、政治の倫理化であつて、其の倫理化は、一家、一町村、一國より、延いて世界に及ぼすべきものと、信じてゐた。従て維新の政府は、戦争に依て出で來つたが、維新の政府が、將來の戦争を爲さんが爲めに、出で來つた政府でなくして、現在の平和を、一國に維持し、繼ては世界の平和を、國際的に維持する事を、主眼とした事は、今更ら言ふ迄もない。

× × × × × × × × ×

予は決して如上の觀察を、机上の空論に依て、語る者ではない。維新政府を組織したる、重なる人物に就て、其の一人一人を吟味するも、未だ會て後三職者が、維新の根本政策を、作爲したとか、指導したと云ふ事は、事實の上に、其の痕跡だも、見出す事が出來ぬ。殊に日本の主となる、維新政府の政治家である岩倉、木戸、大久保等は、明治四年（一八七一）の末より、明治六年（一八七三）の半ば迄、アメリカより歐羅

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巴を巡回し、親しく歐米諸國の現状を見て、到底日本の現状では、歐米諸國と競争などは、出来るものではない。先づ第一に、日本の位地を上せしむる事を、本務とせねばならぬ。それには、凡有る外國の長所を取り入れる事を、急務とせねばならぬと云ふ事に、其の決心を固めて來た。従て維新政府が、軍國主義であるとか、軍國主義の卵であると云ふ事は、夢更ら無き事である。明治天皇は、維新の當初は、未だ幼少であらせられて、自ら政治を判断するの、資格は、學修中であつたが、明治十年（一八七七）より以後は、漸次に天皇親政の、名ばかりでなく、實が行はれて來た。而して天皇の最も信頼せられたる、政治上の相談相手は、前に岩倉、後には伊藤の二人であつた。此の二人とも、何れも平和的政治家であつて、何人も此の兩人を以て、軍國主義者と見做す者はあるまい。」且つ又、個人として、明治天皇に、畏れながら最も深甚なる感化を與へ暮りたるは、日本人としては元田永孚である。元田永孚は、如何なる事を天皇に告げたかは、予が會て出版したる「元田先生追憶録」が、詳しく之を語つてゐる。彼は横井小楠を縮少版としたやうな漢であ





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要するに明治の中期迄は、日本は如何にすれば、完全なる獨立國となる事が出来るかと云ふ點に就て、政府も人民も、其の憂身を要した。凡そ日本人の心を悩ましたる、最も大なるものは、日本に治外法權の存在したる事、日本人の手に存在せざる事の二つであつた。此の税關法權の回復は、如何なる結果を拂うても、遂行せん事を期したが、それに就ては、日本の意見は、自ら二派に岐れた。一は速かに日本の文化の程度を引上げ、外國人が安心するやう、満足するやう、日本を歐米化し、之を實行すべしと云ふ意見と。一は日本は日本流で、立て直し、歐米人も此儘では、永く日本人を應子扱いをせねばならず、其の爲めに、歐米人に取つても、寧ろ不便なる事が多く、困却する事が多いから、歐米人より「我」を折らせて、向ふから條約改正を、日本に申し込む方が、寧ろ近か道である」と云ふ論とである。即ち前者の歐米化主義に對抗して、條約勵行論などが出て來た。即ち條約の文字通り、一點一齣も變更せしめず、例へば外人の自由通行を、十里以内と決めたる以上は、十里から一尺でも足を踏み出す事は、出來ぬやうにして、外人に窮屈を感じしめ、閉口の餘

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り對等條約を、彼れより申込ましめんとする意見であつた。是等の願望で、國內は沸騰したが、それらの事も、明治二十七年（一八九四）以後に至つて、自然に落着する處に落着した。即ち維新以來の、我が官民の勢力が、漸く歐米諸國に認識せられ、對等としては取扱はぬ迄も、三年たてば三つになると云ふだけの、日本の進歩生長を認めて、漸くグランド將軍が言ふたる、完全なる獨立國と殆んどなつた事は、明治政府創立以來、三十年の後であつた。

#### 五 近代日本に於ける内外の刺激

日本に同つて、支那の怖るるに足らざるを誨へた者は、歐米諸國であつた。日本は其の教へを、忠實に遵奉したばかりでなく、それに諭され、支那の恐るるに足らざる事を知つたが、同時に支那に對する尊敬と恐怖に、又た輪をかけて、歐米諸國に傾むけた。然し日本にも、中村敬宇の如きは、明治の初期に、支那侮るべからざる論を、世の中に公けにし、日本人の支那に對する態度を、改めん事を警告した。又た勝海舟の

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如きも、明治二十七八年戦役前後、日本人が支那與し易しと、有頂天になつた際に、支那人の方が、日本人より智識分別が多いと、日本人の浮足を警しめた。此處に日清戦役に就て一言するが、日清戦役は、西暦第七世紀の頃、即ち今より千二百有餘年前、天智天皇の朝に、支那と朝鮮に於て戦ふたる、其の戦争の延長とも言ひ、若くは其の繰返しとも言ふ事が出来る。但だ前に於ては、朝鮮に於ける日本の勢力は、支那の爲めに全く驅逐されたが、二十七八年の役には、朝鮮に於ける支那の勢力を殆ど驅逐し去つた。朝鮮が日本の防禦の第一線であつた事は、日本上古史以來の事であつて、今に始まつた事ではない。日本が朝鮮から、全く撤退した後は、日本從來に倍して、九州の防禦を嚴にした。然し遂ては、朝鮮を策源地として、蒙古の來襲を蒙つた。幸に所謂「神風」の力で、蒙古軍は逐ひ拂つたが、それでも日本人は恐怖心が止まず、其の策源地を一掃せんが爲めに、朝鮮に對する出兵を企てたが、それは内治上の事情で、中止となつた。明治六年（一八七三）に、西郷隆盛等の、所謂「朝鮮論」なるものも、其の眞意は、日本と朝鮮とが、攻守同盟を結び、露

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國に對抗せんとするが、其の目的であつた。然し反對黨は、其の爲に露國との事件を惹起せん事を虞れて、それに反對した。それで反對者も主張者も、總ての見地は、外國の勢力に對する防禦の方法、及び方針に就て、意見が分裂した迄であつて、朝鮮が日本防禦の第一線と云ふは、日本開國以來の常識であつて、誰れもそれを疑ふ者はなかつた。

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話は元に戻つて、支那は元來日本を、物の數とし考へてゐなかつた。其の日本が、或は琉球に手を出し、臺灣に手を出し、朝鮮に手を出すなどと云ふ事を見て、怪しからぬ事をすると思へ、單に日本を侮り賤むばかりでなく、憎み、怒り、且つ怖るゝやうになつた。斯くて支那の慣用手段、近交近攻を利用して、外國の勢力を引つ張つて來て、日本を牽掣し且つ復讐をした。之は支那人としては、決して賢明の仕業ではなかつた。少なくとも當時の所謂、支那分割の端なるものは、茲に開らけた。日本でも、支那戦争中より、支那と握手せん事を期待したる者は、少なくなかつた。伊藤などの如き、平和政治家は云ふ迄もなく、日清戰役に、日本のモルトケの役目を勤めたる、川上將軍の如きも、最も熱心に其事を考へてゐた。而して支那にも、日支提携する方が、支那の長策であると思へた者も、皆無ではなかつた。然し其の多數に就て見れば、日本人は支那與みし易しと云ふ一念が行き渡り、支那に對しては、大なる研究もせず、又た大なる準備もせず、宛かも門前に在る石を、何時でも勝手に之を動かし得るものであるかの如く、考へてゐた。支那の方では、日

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本に對する憤慨心、或は復讐心は、皆な其の胸中に燃へて、何かの機會に、報復する所あらんと、考へてゐた。然し當分の間は、日本には敵はぬから、暫くは蟲を殺して隠忍して、其の時節の到來を待つてゐた。此の如くにして、維新以來日本と支那は、隣國でありながら、又た文字を同じくしてゐながら、遂に相識り相親しむと云ふ迄には至らなかつた。勿論個人間には、相當の交際もあつたが、國としては、徹頭徹尾表向だけの交際であつた。即ち打ち釋けて協力するなどと云ふ事は、遂になかつた。今も此處に日支事變の曲直などに就て、議論をする場合でないから、姑く措くが、日本人は支那與みし易しと云ふ一念の爲めに、自國を失はんばかりに、大なる代價を拂うた。今少し日本人が支那を知り、支那を研究し、支那に向つて善處する論を得たならば、今日の如き事には立ち入らなかつたと思ふが、日本人は同時に二個以上の事を、考へる餘地を持たぬから並に至つたものであらう。兎に角日本人は、支那人を砂の如き民族と、考へてゐたが、支那人は日本人に對する反抗心、敵愾心、復讐心を利用し、我等の點から見れば寧ろ悪用し、濫用したと云ふべき

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程に、對日本の抵抗心を刺激煽動し、此の如くにして、日本は砂である支那人に向つて、セメントたる役目を勤め、今日では砂の塊りではなくして、眼前に突兀たる、一のコンクリートの城を見るに至つたのである此の如くにして、當初日本に向つて、國民的精神を寄與したる支那は、又た久しき距離を隔てて、日本より支那に向つて、利息まで附けて、償還する事となり、此の如くにして、今日國民黨や、又た共產黨までも出で來つたものであらうと判断する事が出来る。然して日本を、支那の馬に乗り替へたる米國なども、果してそれが得策であつたや否やは、今ま茲に明言する限りでない。何れ遠からず歴史が之を語るであらう。

× × × × × × × × × ×

日本には、所謂軍閥なるものは無かつた。是れだけは、予は良心的に之を預言する事が出来る。予は老人であり、且つ壯年以來の新聞記者であるから、凡有る日本の人物に、接觸してゐる。殊に日清事件には、自ら従軍し、日露事件には、極めて密接なる立場より之を眺め、其他軍事に關する凡有る問題に對しても、予は常に意見を發表する事を、憚から

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なかつた。具体的に言へば、日本の陸軍の巨頭は、山縣元帥であつて、此人が日本陸軍を背負つて立つてゐた。然るに此人は、軍人出身ではあつたが、内務大臣とし、又た二回ほど總理大臣とし、後には元老として一般政治に最も大なる感化を及ぼした。日本の軍制を改革して、徴兵令を布きたるは、山縣其人の力であつて、彼は之に依て、五十萬、其の家族を合せて二百五十萬の、武士たる特權階級を廢し、國の義務を、國民全體に領つ事とした。彼は露國とも、出夾得る限り、衝突を避くべく露帝のモスコウに於ける戴冠式には、自ら日本の代表として、出掛けた。彼は日英同盟の、最も熱心なる主張者であり、若くは贊成者であつた。彼れの大なる功績として見るべきは、日本に自治制度を布いたる事である。予は彼とは、政治上の意見が、全く同一ではなかつたが、彼は恐らくは、近代百年に亘る、日本に於ける大なる政治家の一人である。彼は軍國主義者ではなかつた。唯だ平和の爲めに、我國防禦の爲めに、軍備を充實する事を、希冀してゐた。彼は一般陸軍に對しては、刺激力ではなくして、主に鎮壓力となつてゐた。予が編著「山縣公傳」――正傳也――

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余照之は同時に、海軍の中心勢力であつた西郷（弟）、山本、東郷等に就ても、言ふ事が出来る。殊に西郷と山本は、世界協調論者であつて、我より進んで、事を起こすなどと云ふ事は、絶対に反對した。其他予の知り得る範圍に於ては、陸海軍の重なる人士は、其通りと云ふ事が出来る。例へば大山元帥の如きも、滿洲軍の總司令官として、日本を出立するに際し、戦争の責には我等奮て之に當る。然かも平和の政策は、公等決して其の時機を誤まる莫れと、堅執に言ひ残したと云ふ事である。故に大正の中期迄は、殆ど一切の事が秩序整然として、明治天皇の平和の意思を違ひして行つたが其の以後に於て、我が政界に變遷を來したのは、何故である乎。それは内と外との兩者から、之を觀察する必要がある。

先づ内から言へば、大正天皇の末期よりは、政黨内閣が行はれ、或は官僚内閣が行はれ、或は政黨と官僚との混合内閣が行はれ、種々の内閣が行はれた。然かも政黨は横暴を極めて、國民少くとも良民の信用を、殆ど失墜した。官僚内閣も亦た異つたる意味に於て、國民の信用を失ふた



政治の争ひは、唯だ其の位地を得ん事の争ひであり、位地を得て後には唯だ其の利益を得ん事の争ひであつた。固より其間に、一貫の目的があつたでもなければ、一定の方針があつたでもない。唯だ全く手から口、其日暮しの政治であつて、跡は野となれ山となれ、唯だ現在の安きを貪り、所欲を達すれば足ると云ふやうな状態であつた。そこで政黨に失望し、官憲に失望したる国民は、唯だ軍人の間に、若くは軍隊の間に、初めて國家に忠實なる人物を見出す事が出来ると考へた。而して軍人中の若者、即ち學校を出でて未だ年月を経ざる中少尉、經つて漸く中少佐位の所には、自ら日本改革の役目を、買つて出でたる者が出来た。之が爆發して、或は五、一五事件とか、二、二六事件とか云ふものか出で來つた。若し世の中に、軍閥と云ふ言葉を用ふる事が出来れば、或は軍人中の寧ろ一小部分である此の一派一味を指して、言ふ事が出来るかも知れぬが、然し軍其ものとしては、未だ會て軍閥などと云ふものは、在り得なかつた。唯だ不幸なるは日本であつて、總ての腐敗から、總ての無能力から、取り込まれたる、最後の恃みであつた所の軍人階級も、いざと

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なれば、政府官僚に劣らぬ態度を、暴露し來りたるは、洵に以て遺憾の極みであるが、然し世間で稱ふる、所謂軍閥などと云ふものの、存在してゐなかつた事は、予の語りたる所に依て、之を知る事が出來やう。

・ × × × × × × × × × ×

外からの刺激は、即ち第一回世界大戰以後であつて、從來日英同盟に依て、少なくとも東亞の安定は、保たれてゐたが、世界大戰後間もなく、之は有れども無きが如き姿となつた。ヴェルサイユ會議に於ける日本は同盟國の英國及び其の植民地から、手厳しき取扱を受け、又た其の準與國とも云ふべき米國からは、尙更ら厳しくやりつけられた。總てはワシントン會議となつて、此の會議で日英同盟は、全く廢棄せられ、米英連合の力に依て、漸く一人前とならんとする日本は、押さへ付けられた。兎角人は、相手側ばかり見て、已れを考へる事はないが、若し世界大戰以後、或は更に溯つて、日露戰爭以後、米英諸國が、如何なる態度を以て、日本に臨みたるかを反省せば、思半ばに過ぎるものかあらうと思ふ日本は漸く一人前となつて、之からこそ列強と手を携へて、世界の舞臺

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に、乗り出す事が、出来やうと考へた所、豈料らんや、荆棘の重國に陥つたやうな状態を、自ら見出した。日本の諺に、「出る杭は叩かれる」と言ふが、日本は愈々叩かれる時期に到達したのだ。明治維新の際には日本の人口は三千餘萬であつた。然るに大正の末期には、七千萬を數ふるに至つた。人口は年々百萬以上増加しつゝある。食糧不足は觀面に起つて來た。然かも日本は世界の何れの處に於ても、高札を立てゝ、日本人入る可らずと云ふ事になり、折角入り込んだる土地からも、追放せられ、若くはせられんとする困難に立到つた。而して日本開國以來の親友であつた米國の如きも、日本を假裝敵として、其の大海軍を建設した。露國は素より傳統的日本の脅威として、日本に臨んでゐる。然かも隣國の支那は、相變らず遠交近攻の政策を妨げ、日本の出鼻を挫きつゝある。然るに日本の内閣なるものは、此の如き國家の危急を、他所事に眺めて唯だ、得ざる者は得ん事を欲し、得たる者は失はざらん事を欲し、政權や利權の爭奪のみを維れ事として、國家の安危存亡などは、殆ど顧みるに遑なかつた。斯かる場合に於て、軍隊の若者等が憤慨したのも、相當

理由ありと云はねばならぬ。又た國民の或者が、之に同情を表したのも決して偶然ではあるまい。之が即ち大正の末期から、昭和の中期に亘る實際の日本の情勢であつたと、長き年の経験は、斯く觀察せしむるものである。

六 日本の自存、自衛、の自意

予は歴史家の立場から、且又半官に以上に亘る新聞記者の立場から觀察して、日本は侵略者でなく、日本國民は侵略者でなく、寧ろ其の反對で、平和論者であり、同時に世界列國の中で、最も平和を愛好する國民である事を、斷言する者である。且つ決して自ら其意を以て、世界に對するところではなく、表面は兎も角も、内心は固く小 物質は貧、文化は低いと云ふ、寧ろ我れ自ら我が、他に對して大なる嫉妬ある事を自覺し、其の自覺心から、或は漢賊となり、追従となり、反抗となり、置いて自ら特別の地位を作つて、或は其の劣等感を慰むるに至つたものである事を、斷言するに憚らない。

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凡そ世界に、日本人ほど、自己中心的國民は無い。日本人は自己を置いて、凡そ世界の事を觀察する事を、一の國民性としてゐるが、自ら世界に向つて、進出し行くと云ふやうな事は、其の本性ではない。日本は古き文獻である魏志、即ち神皇正統記の前に告げる所傳の文句を讀めば、同も彼も日本に引寄せると云ふ事を、宣言してゐるが、日本より推し出

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すと云ふ事は、一も語つてゐない。世界が日本に向つて、日本は世界より受けるものが甚だ多くて、正に其ふるものは甚だ少ないと言つてゐるが、其實は、それが國民性と言つてもよからう。之は恐らくは當初から、日本人は受くる事の資格は、十二分に持つてゐるが、與ふる事の資格は、持つてゐなかつたと云ふ事を、證據立つる一端であらう。それで日本人には、内に引寄せゐる力は十であつて、外に延長する力は、零であると言へぬが、殆どそれにちかつた。彼等は政變に繼着して、偶々異郷に赴くも、常に故郷の空を眺めてゐた事は、曆時代に日本の習俗として支那に赴き、支那では成功して、大官となつたる安倍仲麻呂へも、尚ほ「三笠の山に出でし月かも」と云ふて、奈良に於ける日本の光景を慕慕してゐた。斯かる求心力少くして、遠心力乏しき國民が、世界を征服するとか、隣國を侵略するとかと云ふ考の、あるべき筈はない。然るに其の國民が、維新以後諸方に出かけたのは、何であるか。生活難である。衣食の缺乏が、彼等を引き立て、其の國民性に反して進み、外に向はしめたものである。

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維新以後の、日本政府と云はず、國民と云はず、寧ろ日本國の運動は、第一は自存の爲めである。即ち日本國民が、生活する爲めに、衣食を求むる爲めに、外に向つて動き出した事。第二は自衛の爲めである。日本國が、完全の獨立國となる事を、務むるばかりでなく、完全の獨立國として、永久に其の地位を保つべく、國家の完全なる獨立を、外來の勢力より防禦する爲めに、運動したるものにして、明治より現代に至りたる日本國民が、餘蘊なく戰爭に従事したるのも、畢竟多くは皆を如上の理由に基づくものである。即ち自存自衛の爲めである。

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第三に數ふべきは、自尊心である。即ち一面に於ては、完全なる獨立國として、世界列強並に待遇せられざる不平、不満の爆發したる抗議である。又た世界列強が爲す所を見て、殊も人なり我れも人なりと云ふやうな氣分になり、英米露獨其他の列國が爲す所を、日本一人指を刺して、之を見物してゐるは、餘りにも不見識であり、餘りにも賸甲斐なくあると云ふ事を考へ、所謂國民的アスピレーションとして、それが原動力となつて、動き出した事も、亦た此中に加へねばならぬ。之は要するに、

日本人の最も多量に持つてゐる誤解の、發源したるものであつて、我等は決して此事を包み隠す事が出来ぬ。例へば、一酌の酒を飲まぬ者でも、其の傍に不潔狼藉、放歌四方に湧き、素人も玄人も雨り出すが如き場合には、假令禁酒會の幹事でも、教會の牧師でも、其心は浮かれて、雨り出す事は當然である。泥んや普通の人間に於てをやだ。若し日本の運動が、萬一其中に帝國主義的の不純の分子がありとすれば、日本人民にそれを口づけた者は、誰れであるか。それは世界列強が皆なそれである、斷言するを憚らない。十九世紀の下半より、二十世紀の上半に於ける日本の歴史は、決して日本だけの歴史でなく、世界共通の歴史であつて、唯だ日本人が、其の役目を果す事に於て、列強人ほど巧みでなかつたと云ふ事は、或は言ひ得るかも知れぬが、日本人はあとから後から、皆を先進國の眞似をして來たものであつて、日本で言ふ「鵜の鵜の眞似」と云ふやうな事は、言ひ得るかも知れぬが、其の手本は、鵜が鵜に眞似たのではなくして、鵜が鵜に眞似たものである。列強は皆な水中に潜ぐつて、大小の魚を獲たが、日本だけはそれを直似して、魚を待たないばかりでなく、已れ自ら水に溺れたのである。日本人の誤は是らぶべからず



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であるが、此の如く形勢を示した先達諸君は、日本人の彼等の拙なきを嘲り、若くは笑ふ事は勝手であるが、之を責め、之を咎め、之を以て日本を罪せんとするが如きは、神の眼から見れば、決して公平の措置ではあるまい。

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今日に於て日本人を咎めれば。支那を見限り、米英諸國を見限り、ソ聯を見限り、獨逸伊太利を見限り、殊に最も多く日本を見限り、孫子の所謂彼を知らず已を知らずして、今日の狀態に立ち到つた一事であつて、日本人としては自棄自棄、離れを咎めべくもなく、若し咎めべき者があれば、我れ自らである。日本人の中には、之を軍閥とか、唯だ其の責任を一局部に推して、涼しき顔をしてゐる者もあるが、總ての行動は、予の見る所に依れば、日本國民全部が負ふべきものである。其の中に淺薄愚の差別はあるが、今更ら今日となつて、知らぬ存ぜぬなどと言つて、己れ一人い子とならんとするが如きは、全く日本精神の何物たるを、亡却したるものと云はねばならぬ。

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予は今日に於ても、日本國民の一として、昭和十六年十二月八日、宣戦の大詔を、其の文字通りに信受したる者である事を、確言するに俾からぬ。固より至尊が、昭和二十年八月十五日、親しく御放送あらせられたる後は、最早や此の詔勅に就て、彼是申すべき筋合でないが、詔勅中のべさせられたる、此の戦争は、日本人に取ては、好ましくないが、強いて相手方より押し付けられたる戦争、即ち受け身の戦争である。日本は所謂 A. B. C. D. の包圍に陥り、立つに立たれず、座るに座られず、此上は死中活路を見出し、暗中の飛躍をなすの外はなしと、決心するに至りたる、其の意味合は、予は今日に於ても、尙ほ其の通りに確信してゐる者である。今日では、此の問題を論ずるには、餘りに時間が接近し、且つ予の如きは、日本の一新聞記者として、其の立場が極めて不利なるが爲めに、或は予の言説は、予が自ら信ずる如くに、他の信用を得る事が、出来ぬかも知れぬが、百年の後公平なる歴史家が出て來つたらば、必ず予の言を諒とするであらうと信ずる。

最後に、新聞記者として予自身に就て述べたい。予は大正の初期から、

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日本の二大書版は、ソ聯と共産である事を確信し、此點に就て、我が國民に廣々警告した。殊に予は、予の幼年以來、フシジニ。フシジニ名だけは相續して、ニューヨークで出版しつゝある雑誌「The Nation」と同一の名目である「國民新聞」と名付けたる雑誌も、「フシジニ」の態度が、太平洋岸に於ける移民問題、華童問題などを始め、ワシントン會議に於て、我れに一大打撃を加へたる以來は、國民的自衛の上人にも、警告するばかりでなく、甚だ危険を感じて、其の爲めに日本とも云ふべき一は、英文に翻譯せられ、ニューヨークに於て出版せられてゐる。

*The Macmillan Co. N.Y. 1922* 予の言論の中には、頗る露骨率直のものがあつたが、之は予が米國の良心より、米人が日本に對する態度を、改め、警告したる文章は、新聞雑誌は勿論、著作の上にも、頗る多く

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設見してゐる。然し時局が忽々進歩に連れて、日本は米國の爲めに、自衛自守を危うくするばかりでなく、日本の生活の上に迄危殆を及ぼし、自衛自守、日本に必須なる貿易品の輸入禁止などが行はれ、所謂日本に於ける通商以來の三大條件が、米國及び其の同盟國の爲めに、悉く喪失せらるゝを見て、此上は是非なしと考へしむるに至つたものであつて、予て今日の狀態に至らしめたる事を、衷心より深く痛嘆する所である。而して予の横井小楠の遺志を継げる、眇たる門弟の一人として、事志と違ふたるを痛嘆し、新聞記者として、一生の勞苦も、殆ど水泡に歸したるを見、自らの微力なるを、今更の如く懺悔する者である。

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極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述者

供述者 德富 信一郎

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ  
如ク供述致シマス

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昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月二十日於

熱海市伊豆山沖出百十九番地

供 述 者 德 富 崇 一 郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同 日 於 同 所

立會人 林 逸 郎



DEF LOC # 632

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良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ詠秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓

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